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SYSTEM AND METHOD FOR DETECTING
UNAUTHORIZED DEVICE ACCESS BY
COMPARING MULTIPLE INDEPENDENT
SPATIAL-TIME DATA SETS FROM OTHER
DEVICES
ORIGIN OF THE INVENTION
The invention described herein was made by an employee
of the United States Government and may be manufactured
and used by or for the Government of the United States of
America for governmental purposes without the payment of
any royalties thereon or therefor.
BACKGROUND
1. Technical Field
The present disclosure relates to authentication by a
system, and more specifically, to a system and method of
authenticating a user or usage of a first device by comparing
usage of the first device with other usage data from at least
one other device that transmits data on an independent data
path from a data path associated with the first device.
2. Introduction
A common challenge in complex computer systems is the
identification of anomalous activity, such as unauthorized
access or use of a device. A common scenario is an unau-
thorized party attempting to nefariously exploit an autho-
rized party's access to a system. Further, unauthorized use of
the device can be from an authorized user who is doing
inappropriate things once the authorized user gains access.
Some approaches have developed to address this challenge,
including multi-factor authentication, use of mobile devices
to validate access, geo-location of the source access loca-
tion, performance monitoring, and monitoring a data stream
from the device in question for unauthorized activity. Some
of the current state-of-art security features rely upon hard-
ware tokens, cookies, geo-location, and passwords. Geo-
location capabilities in devices are commonly available,
making use of Global Positioning System (GPS) receivers,
cellular network tower triangulation, or other means. These
capabilities are suff cient to locate the device to within 10 m
or less when GPS is used, and at 50 m with nominal
triangulation from cell towers. This level or granularity is
sufficient to establish a reasonable probability of the device
being present in a defined geographic area, such as a work
location, or home. Cell tower density is effectively coupled
to cell phone/smartphone density, and in many metropolitan
settings, the cell tower-based geo-location is approaching
satellite-based GPS performance.
However, there still exists a need for improved detection
of inappropriate use or unauthorized access to a device.
Sophisticated attackers can change data or files on a device
and fool detection systems. The prior strategies have not
been able to adequately capture inappropriate access or use.
For example, a sophisticated attacker can alter internal files
on a device, such as a computer, such that reliance on data
from the device regarding its usage may not enable a
detection system to detect the unauthorized use. What is
needed is an improved ability to identify when a device has
been inappropriately accessed or used.
SUMMARY
Additional features and advantages of the disclosure will
be set forth in the description which follows, and in part will
be obvious from the description, or can be learned by
2
practice of the herein disclosed principles. The features and
advantages of the disclosure can be realized and obtained by
means of the instruments and combinations particularly
pointed out in the appended claims. These and other features
5 of the disclosure will become more fully apparent from the
following description and appended claims, or can be
learned by the practice of the principles set forth herein.
An authentication procedure utilizes multiple independent
sources of data to determine whether access to or usage of
10 a device, such as a desktop computer, is authorized. The
procedure includes gathering data from usage patterns or
other data associated with at least two devices such as a
computer and a mobile phone, as well as optionally data
from an independent source such as, for example, a facility
15 access mechanism, lighting data, or an accelerometer on a
keyboard, door or chair. This list is not meant to be overly
narrowing and other sources of data could be provided as
well. The method includes identifying anomalous device use
behavior by receiving three types of data from three sources:
20 (1) first data from a first device, such as a desktop computer,
via a first data path, the first device normally being accessed
by a user; (2) second data from a second device, such as a
mobile phone, associated with the user via a second data
path; and (3) optionally third data from a third data source
25 via a third data path, the third data source being, for
example, an environment sensor. When a comparison indi-
cates an anomaly from the base-line usage data, the system
provides a notice that access of the first device is not
authorized.
30
BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF THE DRAWINGS
FIG. 1 illustrates an example system embodiment;
FIG. 2 illustrates a general structure of various devices for
35 use in detecting unauthorized access;
FIG. 3 illustrates a block diagram of a collection and
detection system; and
FIG. 4 illustrates a method embodiment.
40 DETAILED DESCRIPTION
Various embodiments of the disclosure are described in
detail below. While specific implementations are described,
it should be understood that this is done for illustration
45 purposes only. Other components and configurations may be
used without parting from the spirit and scope of the
disclosure.
A system, method, and computer-readable storage devices
are disclosed, which address the issue raised above regard-
50 ing an improved detection of unauthorized access to a
device. An authentication procedure utilizes multiple inde-
pendent sources of data to determine whether usage of a
device, such as a desktop computer, is authorized. A method
embodiment includes gathering data from usage patterns
55 associated with at least two devices such as a computer and
a mobile phone. The method can retrieve data from three or
more independent sources as well. Thus, the method can
receive and process additional data from an independent
source such as a facility (building) access mechanism,
60 lighting data, or an accelerometer on a keyboard, door or
chair. The method includes identifying anomalous device
use behavior by receiving two, three, or more types of data
from two or more sources, such as, for example, one or more
of the following: (1) first data from a first device, such as a
65 desktop computer, via a first data path, the first device
normally being accessed by a user, (2) second data from a
second device, such as a mobile phone, associated with the
US 9,749,342 B1
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user via a second data path; and (3) third data from a third
data source via a third data path, the third data source being
something like a facilities access system or an accelerometer
attached to a keyboard or other item. When a comparison
indicates an anomaly from the base-line usage data, the
system provides a notice that access of the first device is not
authorized.
The reference to what the user "normally" does by way of
use of a device generally means a device that the user
accesses most days or every day at a particular location such
as work or home. Many individuals have a work computer
that is at a desk or cubicle that they access every day. It may
be a laptop that is attached to a docking station or a desktop
computer. This term is not limited however to an exclusive
device used by only one person. Two people may share a
computing device and each "normally" use that device. This
term generally means that there is a device that a person uses
to the extent that is it expected that is not an anomalous event
for them at gain access to the device and use the device,
whether they are the only person expected to do so, or
whether another person or a group of people can also be
expected to access and use the device.
Abrief introductory description of a basic general purpose
system or computing device in FIG. 1 which can be
employed to practice the concepts, methods, and techniques
disclosed is illustrated. A more detailed description of other
embodiments of the unauthorized access detection system
and method will then follow.
These variations shall be described herein as the various
embodiments are set forth. The disclosure now turns to FIG.
1.
With reference to FIG. 1, an exemplary system and/or
computing device 100 includes a processing unit (CPU or
processor) 120 and a system bus 110 that couples various
system components, including the system memory 130, such
as read only memory (ROM) 140 and random access
memory (RAM) 150 to the processor 120. The system 100
can include a cache 122 of high-speed memory connected
directly with, in close proximity to, or integrated as part of
the processor 120. The system 100 copies data from the
memory 130 and/or the storage device 160 to the cache 122
for quick access by the processor 120. In this way, the cache
122 provides a performance boost that avoids processor 120
delays while waiting for data. These and other modules can
control or be configured to control the processor 120 to
perform various operations or actions. Other system
memory 130 may be available for use as well. The memory
130 can include multiple different types of memory with
different performance characteristics. It can be appreciated
that the disclosure may operate on a computing device 100
with more than one processor 120 or on a group or cluster
of computing devices networked together to provide greater
processing capability. The processor 120 can include any
general purpose processor and a hardware module or soft-
ware module, such as module 1 162, module 2 164, and
module 3 166 stored in storage device 160, configured to
control the processor 120 as well as a special-purpose
processor where software instructions are incorporated into
the processor. The processor 120 may be a self-contained
computing system, containing multiple cores or processors,
a bus, memory controller, cache, etc. A multi-core processor
may be symmetric or asymmetric. The processor 120 can
include multiple processors, such as a system having mul-
tiple, physically separate processors in different sockets, or
a system having multiple processor cores on a single physi-
cal chip. Similarly, the processor 120 can include multiple
distributed processors located in multiple separate comput-
4
ing devices, but working together such as via a communi-
cations network. Multiple processors or processor cores can
share resources such as memory 130 or the cache 122, or can
operate using independent resources. The processor 120 can
5 include one or more of a state machine, an application
specific integrated circuit (ASIC), or a programmable gate
array (PGA) including a field PGA.
The system bus 110 may be any of several types of bus
structures including a memory bus or memory controller, a
io peripheral bus, and a local bus using any of a variety of bus
architectures. A basic input/output (BIOS) stored in ROM
140 or the like, may provide the basic routine that helps to
transfer information between elements within the computing
device 100, such as during start-up. The computing device
15 100 further includes storage devices 160 or computer-
readable storage media such as a hard disk drive, a magnetic
disk drive, an optical disk drive, tape drive, solid-state drive,
RAM drive, removable storage devices, a redundant array of
inexpensive disks (RAID), hybrid storage device, or the like.
20 The storage device 160 can include software modules 162,
164, 166 for controlling the processor 120. The system 100
can include other hardware or software modules. The stor-
age device 160 is connected to the system bus 110 by a drive
interface. The drives and the associated computer-readable
25 storage devices provide nonvolatile storage of computer-
readable instructions, data structures, program modules and
other data for the computing device 100. In one aspect, a
hardware module that performs a particular function
includes the software component stored in a tangible com-
30 puter-readable storage device in connection with the neces-
sary hardware components, such as the processor 120, bus
110, display 170, and so forth, to carry out a particular
function. In another aspect, the system can use a processor
and computer-readable storage device to store instructions
35 which, when executed by the processor, cause the processor
to perform operations, a method or other specific actions.
The basic components and appropriate variations can be
modified depending on the type of device, such as whether
the device 100 is a small, handheld computing device, a
4o desktop computer, or a computer server. When the processor
120 executes instructions to perform "operations", the pro-
cessor 120 can perform the operations directly and/or facili-
tate, direct, or cooperate with another device or component
to perform the operations.
45 Although the exemplary embodiment(s) described herein
employs the hard disk 160, other types of computer-readable
storage devices which can store data that are accessible by
a computer, such as magnetic cassettes, flash memory cards,
digital versatile disks (DVDs), cartridges, random access
50 memories (RAMS) 150, read only memory (ROM) 140, a
cable containing a bit stream and the like, may also be used
in the exemplary operating environment. Tangible com-
puter-readable storage media, computer-readable storage
devices, or computer-readable memory devices, expressly
55 exclude media such as transitory waves, energy, carrier
signals, electromagnetic waves, and signals per se.
To enable user interaction with the computing device 100,
an input device 190 represents any number of input mecha-
nisms, such as a microphone for speech, a touch-sensitive
60 screen for gesture or graphical input, keyboard, mouse,
motion input, speech and so forth. An output device 170 can
also be one or more of a number of output mechanisms
known to those of skill in the art. In some instances,
multimodal systems enable a user to provide multiple types
65 of input to communicate with the computing device 100.
The communications interface 180 generally governs and
manages the user input and system output. There is no
US 9,749,342 B1
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restriction on operating on any particular hardware arrange-
ment and therefore the basic hardware depicted may easily
be substituted for improved hardware or firmware arrange-
ments as they are developed.
For clarity of explanation, the illustrative system embodi-
ment is presented as including individual functional blocks
including functional blocks labeled as a "processor" or
processor 120. The functions these blocks represent may be
provided through the use of either shared or dedicated
hardware, including, but not limited to, hardware capable of
executing software and hardware, such as a processor 120,
that is purpose-built to operate as an equivalent to software
executing on a general purpose processor. For example, the
functions of one or more processors presented in FIG. 1 may
be provided by a single shared processor or multiple pro-
cessors. (Use of the term "processor" should not be con-
strued to refer exclusively to hardware capable of executing
software.) Illustrative embodiments may include micropro-
cessor and/or digital signal processor (DSP) hardware, read-
only memory (ROM) 140 for storing software performing
the operations described below, and random access memory
(RAM) 150 for storing results. Very large scale integration
(VLSI) hardware embodiments, as well as custom VLSI
circuitry in combination with a general purpose DSP circuit,
may also be provided.
The logical operations of the various embodiments are
implemented as: (1) a sequence of computer implemented
steps, operations, or procedures running on a programmable
circuit within a general use computer, (2) a sequence of
computer implemented steps, operations, or procedures run-
ning on a specific-use programmable circuit; and/or (3)
interconnected machine modules or program engines within
the programmable circuits. The system 100 shown in FIG. 1
can practice all or part of the recited methods, can be a part
of the recited systems, and/or can operate according to
instructions in the recited tangible computer-readable stor-
age devices. Such logical operations can be implemented as
modules configured to control the processor 120 to perform
particular functions according to the programming of the
module. For example, FIG.1 illustrates three modules Modl
162, Mod2 164, and Mod3 166, which are modules config-
ured to control the processor 120. These modules may be
stored on the storage device 160 and loaded into RAM 150
or memory 130 at runtime or may be stored in other
computer-readable memory locations.
One or more parts of the example computing device 100,
up to and including the entire computing device 100, can be
virtualized. For example, a virtual processor can be a
software object that executes according to a particular
instruction set, even when a physical processor of the same
type as the virtual processor is unavailable. A virtualization
layer or a virtual "host' can enable virtualized components
of one or more different computing devices or device types
by translating virtualized operations to actual operations.
Ultimately, however, virtualized hardware of every type is
implemented or executed by some underlying physical hard-
ware. Thus, a virtualization compute layer can operate on
top of a physical compute layer. The virtualization compute
layer can include one or more of a virtual machine, an
overlay network, a hypervisor, virtual switching, and any
other virtualization application.
The processor 120 can include all types of processors
disclosed herein, including a virtual processor. However,
when referring to a virtual processor, the processor 120
includes the software components associated with executing
the virtual processor in a virtualization layer and underlying
hardware necessary to execute the virtualization layer. The
T
system 100 can include a physical or virtual processor 120
that receives instructions stored in a computer-readable
storage device, which cause the processor 120 to perform
certain operations. When referring to a virtual processor
5 120, the system also includes the underlying physical hard-
ware executing the virtual processor 120.
Having disclosed some components of a computing sys-
tem, the disclosure now turns to FIG. 2, which illustrates a
network of devices and systems in which the concepts of this
io disclosure will operate.
FIG. 2 illustrates an environment 200, which includes two
general sub-environments including a remote work location
202 and a local facility 214, which represents a work
environment such as an office building.
15 As is shown, the remote work location 202 includes
several devices, including a mobile workstation 204 com-
municating through a data link to an internet access network
210, which can represent any known access network, such as
a local modem and/or router. A mobile personal device 208
20 can communicate using wireless network access to the
internet access network 210, using WIFI or other commu-
nication protocols, as well as communicates via a cellular
data connection to a cellular data network 212. The remote
user 206 is represented as using these two devices. Of course
25 other devices could also be represented and the remote work
location 202 can represent any location, not just a work
related location. For example, the mobile work station 204
can also represent a desktop computer or a media device,
such as Apple TV or other communication device, which
30 communicates with the internet access network 210 or the
cellular data network 212. In other words, any device in the
remote location 202 can be included. Such devices could
also include dishwashers, refrigerators, alarm systems,
smoke detectors, systems within automobiles to provide data
35 regarding an automobile location and functionality, and so
forth. Any and all of these types of devices can be repre-
sented as one of the devices 204, 208. Indeed, part of this
disclosure could encompass utilizing data communicated
from 2, 3, 4, 5, and/or more different devices or any
40 combination of two or more of any number of devices for
purposes of data collection and anomalous activity and
access detection. Data from an internet access network 210
and a cellular data network 212 can be communicated to the
internet 213 or other communication network as well.
45 In the local facility 214, the local user 230, which can
represent the remote user 206 when the remote user comes
to work or can represent another user, has the personal
mobile device 208 and a fixed or mobile workstation 232.
The person 230 at location 214 generally represents the local
50 user 230 coming to work while carrying his mobile device
208 and utilizing a local fixed or mobile workstation 232 to
do his daily work. The mobile personal device 208 can
communicate with the cellular data network 212 as well as
a local site network 216 via WIFI or some other communi-
55 cation protocol. The fixed or mobile workstation 232 also
communicates with the site network 216, which can com-
municate to the internet 213. A monitoring system 218 is
shown having several components. A first feature is a
telemetry collection component 220. This component is
60 essentially a data store that receives information from the
site network 216. The information received can include data
regarding usage of the fixed or mobile workstation 232, the
use and location of the personal mobile device 208 as well
as other data received via the internet 213, which relates to
65 usage of, the location of, or other data associated with the
mobile workstation 204 and the personal mobile device 208,
while at the remote work location 202 and/or another
US 9,749,342 B1
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location. The component 220 can also receive other data
such as usage and location data from any of the other
devices, vehicles, appliances, and so forth identified above.
The data store in the telemetry collection component 220
can be communicated to or retrieved from a change detec-
tion component 222, which stores the logical and analytical
engine for determining whether anomalous behavior occurs
as shall be described below.
In addition, the local facility 214 can have a facility
physical access control component 226 and a facility envi-
ronmental component 228. These components communicate
data to the telemetry collection component 220, as is shown
in FIG. 2. The components may also communicate through
the site network 216, the cellular network 212 or any other
means to communicate data to the telemetry collection
components 220.
A local access control component 225 communicates with
one or more of the telemetry collection component 220, the
fixed or mobile workstation 232, and the network 216.
Through the network 216, the logical access control com-
ponent 225 can also communicate with the mobile worksta-
tion 204 and/or the personal mobile device 208. The func-
tion of component 225 is similar to the facility physical
access control component 226, but the logical access control
component 225 is an example of a corporate authentication
system in which a username/password, a smartcard, an RSA
token, etc., are used for authentication. The user/employee
presents credential and authentication information to the
logical access control component 225. The logical access
control component 225 validates the information and returns
a decision to the device (workstation 232 or other device)
whether the user is authorized to proceed, or whether the
authentication failed (such as with an incorrect password).
The component 225 is used in a context of many solely-
remote users, and where the system 214 would not have the
same type of information stream that it would gain from the
facility physical access control component 226.
FIG. 3 illustrates a simplified version of FIG. 2 and shows
a network of devices 300, including the personal mobile
device 208 and the mobile workstation 204 that communi-
cates information to the telemetry collection component
220. These generally represent devices that are outside of a
work environment or a particularly chosen environment.
The personal mobile device 208 and the fixed station 232 are
generally represented as being in a particular environment,
such as a work environment. In this context, the devices
208/232 also communicate data to the telemetry collection
component 220. As is shown in FIG. 3, there can be multiple
layers of each of these devices representing different sets of
devices for a particular user or multiple users that may be
similarly situated.
Also shown in FIG. 3 is a simplified version of the
physical access control component 226 and the facility
environmental component 228 that each communicate data
to the telemetry collection component 220, which then
provides the data to the change detection component 222.
Also shown in FIG. 3 is an "other devices" 302 represen-
tation that illustrates one or more additional devices which
also communicates data to the telemetry collection compo-
nent 220. For example, these devices 302 can represent a
device embedded in a vehicle, which reports vehicle usage
and location, devices embedded in washers, dryers, toasters,
refrigerators, security systems, fire alarms, and so forth.
Such devices 302 can also represent sources of information,
which may be related to the user 206/230 such as data from
a security camera or cameras at traffic lights that may take
images of the user's vehicle with license plate identification,
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and so forth. Thus, the other devices box 302 represents all
other data sources as described above as well as any other
separate data sources not specifically identified. All of this
data is stored in the telemetry collection component 220 for
5 use by the change detection component 222 as shall be
described next.
Having discussed the basic environment and devices used
according to the principles of this disclosure, as set forth in
FIGS. 1, 2, and 3. More specific details regarding the use of
10 information from these various devices in the context of
detection of unauthorized access or usage is presented next.
It is expected that a software application would be added to
the various devices discussed above for the purpose of
15 gathering device status, geo-location, environmental sensor
data, and usage/performance data or characterization. Such
software can be added via an application that is downloaded
or via an operating system. Existing capabilities of the
various devices can also be utilized to gather data. The
20 particular manner in which the data is gathered is not
relevant to the present disclosure other than to recognize that
the data would need to be gathered and then transmitted to
a network so that it can ultimately be received at the
telemetry collection component 220 and processed by the
25 change detection component 222. The data is useful to
discern a legitimate user's authorized actions from unau-
thorized actions as well as unauthorized access. The unau-
thorized actions can be by the legitimate user or by an
unauthorized party making use of the authorized party's
so access. For example, an authorized user may legitimately
gain access to their workstation 232 at work but then
proceed to perform unauthorized operations or access unau-
thorized files. The basic concepts disclosed herein relate to
utilizing the combination of data about the state and usage
35 of two or more devices including. For example, a geo-
location of a device such as a cell phone or smartphone can
be used, or the operating environment description data for a
device, all of which data becomes part of a process to
monitor for inappropriate use or unauthorized access. Col-
40 lecting and analyzing data from various separate data
streams without extensive costs is possible and can be cost
effective in the manner proposed.
It is noted that the data that can be reported to the
telemetry collection component system 220 not only
45 includes data regarding whether a user has accessed the
building or a particular room which information can be
identified from the facility physical access control compo-
nent 226, but also includes data from other sensors related
to ambient temperature, magnetosphere and compass read-
50 ings, ambient light level or proximity sensors and so on. This
type of data can come from a facility environmental com-
ponent 228. An example of such usage could be when a user
enters a room, the room light level might increase when the
user turns on a light or an automatic motion sensor turns on
55 a light. The ambient temperature of the room may go up
slightly given the presence of the person 230 in the room.
Motion detectors, environment sensors (such as, for
example, an accelerometer) can be positioned on a key-
board, a chair or a phone can identify movement or use of
60 these items within the office and such movement and usage
can be detected over time to establish a baseline usage. This
is, of course, in addition to workstation 232 usage, mobile
device 208 usage, and so forth. The system can gather data
both from the remote location 202 as well as the local
65 facility 214 and process data from the multiple devices and
facility components to establish a baseline pattern of activity
for the user 206/230.
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In this regard, the system will continually ingest multiple
time-series streams of data from the sources identified above
related to individual authorized users 230. The data from the
individual authorized users' workstations 232, personal
mobile devices 208 and use of the facilities 226/228 will be 5
processed in a time-series manner. Over time, these time-
based streams can be analyzed and used to establish a
particular self-consistency based on a defined rule set and a
baseline use of their personal mobile device 208 and the
facilities 226/228. One example of baseline usage is the io
following. Typically, a user's personal mobile device 208
location is going to be within a small distance from a
workstation 232 location at any login event. Similarly, the
user should be reported and recorded as in a predefined
facility 214, which information can be identified via the 15
physical access control system such as a badge reader if the
user is working at a location with such a system.
The system disclosed herein can leverage any time-series
set sensor readings to assess behavioral patterns. The target
sensor readings are those that can be correlated with other 20
independent sensors, such as parallel sensors operating in
the same sensing domain. The sensing domain is inferred by
location information, from other sensors or pre-defined
values (e.g., specific physical location), that fall within that
sensor's detection range. A higher number of correlated 25
sensor readings will generally yield better aggregate results
to identify potential anomalies.
One authorized user is expected to directly interface with
two or more physical devices. Ideally, some or all of the
authorized user's activities will occur in a controlled physi- 30
cal facility with additional sensor capabilities.
Some incidental information can be acquired in conjunc-
tion with sensor readings, such as amount of available
memory, number of Central Processing Units (CPUs or
cores), and other "fixed" information. Such information is 35
used to facilitate interpretation of the sensor readings, and is
not generally expected to be part of the behavioral analysis
parameters.
One physical device, such as a laptop or smartphone, can
offer hundreds of discrete sensor sources. Most of these 40
sensors provide an objective measure from discrete hard-
ware components, such as temperature or fan speed. Some
"virtual" sensors are established by synthesizing readings
from software analysis of activity. For example, a commonly
used reading is CPU load. CPU load can be a synthesized 45
value of the discrete usage levels across the multiple indi-
vidual processors (the CPUs or cores) that in turn include
multiple processing pipelines commonly used in parallel.
In one approach of validating the user 230 is at login,
when nominal computer checks can occur and run as a 50
background process like many other processes running on
the computer. The system will store data from the login
event and at some defined period of time the stored data can
be transferred to the monitoring system 220. Similar stored
data records from the facility component 226 and/or envi- 55
ronmental component 228 and/or the personal mobile device
208 can be also sent to the monitoring system 220. When the
user 230 accesses the computer 232 with valid credentials a
separate post login analysis of the independent streams of
data from the personal mobile device 208, the workstation 60
232, the facility component 226 and the environmental
component 228, if applicable, can occur. Any combination
of data from these independent streams can also occur. For
example, the system may only take data from the facility
access control 226 and the workstation 232. 65
Checks of proximity status with the mobile device 208 are
easy to perform and are generally known in the art. The user
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being in the facility 214 where the user 230 is expected, and
carrying the personal mobile device 208 that the user is
expected to carry, can be tracked. Furthermore, having time
stamps consistent with the user's logical access record will
generate a monitoring system confirmation with location
consistency.
Other sophisticated checks can also be utilized for some
users and can act as finger prints. For example, active
external input/output (I/O) ports on the workstation 232 can
be compared with keystroke patterns on a keyboard. While
no specific data set can be universally defining, many
combinations and permutations can be processed and make
it very difficult for an illegitimate user to masquerade as the
real user. In other words, the basic concept disclosed herein
is utilizing these two or more different independent time/
spatial data streams to detect illegitimate use or access. An
unauthorized party might be able to focus in one aspect of
usage and masquerade as the real user. However, deviations
from baseline activity in so many different data streams can
indicate anomalous activity and make it more difficult for an
illegitimate user to masquerade every aspect of data that is
collected according to this disclosure. The system 222 can
identify deviations from baseline activity in a number of
different respects. The system can detect new legitimate
activity, a legitimate user conducting unauthorized use, or an
unauthorized party making use of the legitimate access (by
hiding inside of a legitimate access) or an unauthorized party
attempting to be recognized as the legitimate user. Such
unauthorized activity can be manifest by detecting differ-
ences in explainable inconsistencies from the baseline. Thus,
a hostile party attempting to cloak as a legitimate user would
need to be aware of, and stay within, the variety of baseline
measurements. By requiring multiple devices with indepen-
dent measurements, geo-location and activity measures, the
probability and ability of detecting unauthorized use
increases. Therefore, the disclosed system provides a
complementary capability to conventional preventative
measures, such as multifactor authentication and access
control systems. A traditional attack against authentication
and monitoring systems is to capture and replay the infor-
mation stream in an effort to bypass the security checks. An
example of this attack is to send a looped video capture to
a security camera so that the security monitoring team is
unaware of a change in the monitored environment. In the
context of the present disclosure, where the attacker is
attempting to masquerade as an authorized party, the dis-
closed techniques will reduce the success rate such an attack.
Without the ability to replay the data synchronously across
all the input streams, the disclosed techniques will identify
the anomaly. These disclosed techniques can still work even
when other authentication and data integrity practices, such
as multifactor authentication and cryptographically pro-
tected data connections, are bypassed.
Because the consistency checks can use almost any inter-
nal data from any of the components (i.e., workstations 232,
personal mobile devices 208, facilities 226), the specifics of
any analysis tool can vary. As is shown in FIG. 2, much of
the data will be from the workstation 232 but the personal
mobile devices 208 all offer much data as well. The data
transmission path from the workstations 232 and the per-
sonal mobile devices 208 should be as diverse as possible to
the monitoring system 218 to maximize the utility of col-
laborating data from the two or more separate inputs to the
monitoring system 218.
Over time, the user 230 will generally exhibit consistent
activity, including changes in work assignments and so
forth. In this regard, an operator 224 may provide data which
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suggests a change in consistent activity. For example, if an
employee 230 gets a new work assignment, the operator
224, or other source of change, can provide data identifying
the new change to monitoring system 218 so that what
otherwise might look like anomalous activity is recognized
as potentially being expected given a change in a work
assignment.
As identified by a series of measures from the various
discrete devices, an activity profile can be established and
deviations from that profile identified for further review or
generating an alert to the operator 224.
In one aspect, the workstation 232 will include a new
background process, or new software on the computer, that
collects the data representing the workstation inputs to the
monitoring system, and via some connectivity the data is
transported to the monitoring system 218. The environmen-
tal sensors associated with the facility environmental com-
ponent 228 can also be provided. Internal usage/character-
ization data, such as processor performance in the
workstation 232, I/O activity (e.g., keyboard usage, storage
access, and so forth), can be provided. Other data, such as
chair motion usage, phone usage, and so forth, can be
provided such that such process or thread information relat-
ing to ongoing software activity can be captured at regular
time intervals. The time intervals for these data captures are
calibrated to minimize or reduce the impact of the measure-
ment activity on the device as nominal performance.
In one aspect, it is noted that the timing of reporting of
usage can vary for various devices such as the workstation
232, mobile device 208, facility environmental component
228, and so forth. However, in one aspect, if a potential
anomaly appears to be detected by the monitoring system
218, the system 218 can report back to the software on the
various devices such that a coordination of the timing of
reports can increase or be coordinated. Thus, depending on
the type of anomaly suggested, the monitoring system 218
may signal the workstation 232 and/or the software on the
mobile device 208 to start to increase their reporting fre-
quency to once every half second (or whatever interval
might be appropriate from, for example, once every micro-
second, to once every minute or once every half hour, and so
forth). Similarly, the monitoring system could recognize that
the anomalous data is coming from one of the plurality of
devices from which data is received and the monitoring
system could increase the frequency of reporting from that
device while leaving unchanged, reducing, or partially
increasing the reporting of the second device. Thus, where
the normal reporting interval might be calibrated to mini-
mize the impact of the measurement activity on the device
performance, when an anomaly is detected, the system may
increase that detection activity, even if it affects the perfor-
mance of the device. Furthermore, the monitoring system
may desire to increase the reporting activity in such a way
that might be undetected by the potential attacker. Thus, not
only will the monitoring system increase the reporting
performed by the software on the device with the suspicious
activity, but also the monitoring system could instruct such
a device to alter other software usage, such that the perfor-
mance of the device does not change. Other approaches
might be implemented, such as changing a clock speed or
power usage to mask the increase or change in detection
activity from the attacker. In other words, the monitoring
system might recognize that a potential attacker is partici-
pating in a particular activity and unlikely to detect that a
separate background process is wound down or turned off
such that the monitoring background process, when it
increases its frequency of reporting data, does not affect the
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overall performance of the device. Thus, the potential
attacker may not recognize that increased reporting is occur-
ring of his or her activity, and thus, the monitoring system
218 might be able to detect the illegitimate activity without
5 revealing its detection.
A custom software application can be provided to the
personal mobile device 208 in a similar application on the
workstation 232. Such application provides a self-registra-
tion capability, a start/stop function, and an ongoing collec-
io tion and reporting function of the various data, such as
geo-location, environmental, and/or usage. The application
can also provide a unique identifier to the monitoring system
218 and employee identifier which can be provided by the
employee 230. The personal mobile device software can
15 transmit accrued information via a cellular network or a
wireless network connection, whichever is available or
accessible. The data can also be transmitted across the
internet 212 or any other communication network, to the
monitoring system 218. The workstation 232 transmits the
20 information to the monitoring system typically through
available network access 216 which can be a local area
network or the Internet 213 as well as potentially through a
cellular network 212, which would be on a discrete path
separate from any cellular usage of the mobile device 208.
25 The workstation 232 can also communicate through a wire-
less network or a wired network.
The monitoring system 218 records each separate stream,
including origin information, in the telemetry collection
component 220. The telemetry collection component 220
30 uses commodity data storage systems, which are prepared
for the quantity and variety of data. The origin information
identifies whether a commodity cellular network carrier,
commodity network access, or local access network was
used to transmit the information. The origin identification
35 information is obtained through a fixed lookup table based
on public or employee-reported information, or a commod-
ity service. For each user 230 that accesses their system 232,
the monitoring system 218 will compare the information
from at least two time-data streams. The sources of the at
40 least two time-data streams can include the personal mobile
device 208, the facilities access component 226, the envi-
ronmental component 228, or other data sources such as an
environment sensor. Non-limiting examples of such envi-
ronment sensors include accelerometers on a chair, a tele-
45 phone handset, a mouse, or touch mouse pad or a keyboard
that reports key-press activity or other usage, and so forth.
The streamed information is automatically compared to
prior time periods and between streams. The historical
information compares and identifies whether a shift in
5o behavior has occurred. Intrastream data can also be used to
further refine the expected behavior patterns.
Geo-location information can be used between streams to
determine whether the two devices, such as the workstation
232 and the personal mobile device 208 are in a recognized
55 geographic configuration, such as proximate within a par-
ticular threshold. The system may identify that the user 230
typically places the personal mobile device 208 to the right
of the workstation 232 when the user arrives at work. Thus,
if potential anomalous activity is detected on the workstation
60 232, the system might detect that the personal mobile device
208 is placed on the left of the workstation 232 that day and
this anomaly might heighten the potential that anomalous
activity is occurring. Thus, if the workstation 232 and the
personal mobile device 208 are outside of a recognized
65 configuration or arrangement, an alert can be generated or it
may be determined that this by itself is not sufficiently
unique to justify sending an alert. Geo-location is generally
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limited to GPS quality, and is, thus, in the range of approxi-
mately 10 m. Other systems use GPS for the "geo-fencing"
concept to alert when a device enters or leaves a defined area
within the available tolerance of GPS. GPS supplements,
such as high-sensitivity receivers and knowledge of physical 5
reference points, can improve the accuracy to a few feet.
Newer chipsets for internal positioning systems (such as
Near Field Communication (NFC) or Apple iBeacon posi-
tioning systems) can enable ultra high-precision location
information. The concepts and systems disclosed herein io
contemplate utilizing whatever granularity is capable for
location-based services as part of the data that is analyzed to
detect anomalies.
The facilities data from devices 226 and 228 can also be
provided to the monitoring system 218. This data relates to 15
building access, lighting usage, and temperature. All this
data can be informative as to whether or not a workstation
activity is valid. An artificial transient signal can be injected
as a calibration point into any of the data streams. For
example, a local cell tower repeater or even a GPS signal 20
repeater can be momentarily (such as in seconds or minutes)
turned off to lower the expected performance of the cell
phone and or smartphone geo-location thus altering data in
the phone reporting to the monitoring system. Correlation of
the artificial transient signals at random timings will make it 25
very difficult for an unauthorized user to fake signal content
remotely. If the unauthorized user is embedded inside the
user computer and needs to fake data to hide the unauthor-
ized activity, then the faked reporting will need to be
self-consistent with the environment (which can be ran- 30
domly altered).
A unique aspect of the system is the ongoing integrated
collection, correlation, and analysis of the multiple location
and activity streams for the purposes of defining authorized
legitimate computer use versus anomalous behavior. 35
FIG. 4 illustrates a method embodiment of identifying
anomalous device use or access. The method includes
receiving first data from a first device via a first data path,
the first device normally being accessed by a user (402),
receiving second data from a second device associated with 40
a user via a second data path (404). The method further
includes receiving optional third data from a third data
source associated with the user via a third data path (406)
and comparing the first data, the second data and the
optionally the third data to base-line data comprising usage 45
pattern of the user to yield a comparison (408). Finally, when
the comparison indicates an anomaly from the base-line
data, the method includes providing a notice that access to
the first device is not authorized.
Other actions can be taken too, such as changing the 50
environment to test whether the user is the authorized. For
example, if the authorized user has a habit, when the lights
turn off in his office (for example, when no movement is
detected for a period of time) to turning the lights back on,
then the system could initiate turning the lights off (as 55
though no movement was detected) to see if the user in
question exhibits the same behavior of turning the lights
back on. This test could include presenting something on the
computer, such as an email notice, a meeting notice, or other
activity that is presented to the questionable user to detect 60
the questionable user's response. The response can be fur-
ther evidence of an inappropriate user.
As noted above, the independent sources can be two or
more. Thus, while FIG. 4 illustrates a third data source, it is
contemplated that the comparison may only compare data 65
from a first data source and a second data source via
independent data paths. The data, whether it is the first data,
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second data, or third data, can be location data of the
respective device. Also, any of the data that can be derived
from an environmental sensor such as, for example, an
accelerometer connected to a keyboard, a phone, a chair, a
mouse, and/or a door. Furthermore, any one of the first data,
the second data, and the third data can include one of
temperature data, a magnetosphere reading, a compass read-
ing, a light level, a proximity sensor reading, a keycard
access reading, device performance data, image data, key-
board data, rate of change of any of these parameters,
location data, software usage data, elevation data, social
media data, weather data, responsive actions to test activities
produced by the system, and device internal functionality
data. The base-line data that is discussed above can be data
of usage patterns of the particular individual or of usage
patterns of individuals in a same category as the user. For
example, the user may be part of a team or be at a certain
level within a company and the usage patterns that might be
identified might be not only the usage pattern of the indi-
vidual user but those of the team who are essentially
working on the same project and/or perhaps working in the
same facility or the same set of cubicles or the same set of
offices. Therefore, the base-line data that is used in the
comparison might be not of a single individual but of
similarly situated individuals.
The comparison may indicate an anomaly at different
levels. For example, there potentially could be a low thresh-
old, which would indicate that a potential anomaly or
unauthorized access is beginning. At this stage, the com-
parison may not indicate at a higher threshold that there is
a high enough confidence level that an actual unauthorized
access is occurring. The standard approved user may be
performing an authorized activity that may for some reason
indicate anomalous activity but is a false alarm. However, if
there is a threshold where a potential anomaly appears to
exist, the system could transmit instructions to one of a first
application, a second application or a third application on the
respective devices to adjust a timing of reporting of its data.
A test action could be presented by the system to detect
whether the user response is related to a base-line response
or different. The timing could include an increased number
of reports of the data for any one or more of the devices.
Furthermore, the timing instruction could include adjust-
ments up or down of one or more of the devices in order to
gather more necessary data quickly to determine whether the
potential anomaly might rise to the level of an actual
anomaly and thus trigger the appropriate notice.
Embodiments within the scope of the present disclosure
may also include tangible and/or non-transitory computer-
readable storage devices for carrying or having computer-
executable instructions or data structures stored thereon.
Such tangible computer-readable storage devices can be any
available device that can be accessed by a general purpose
or special purpose computer, including the functional design
of any special purpose processor as described above. By way
of example, and not limitation, such tangible computer-
readable devices can include RAM, ROM, EEPROM, CD-
ROM, or other optical disk storage, magnetic disk storage or
other magnetic storage devices, or any other device which
can be used to carry or store desired program code in the
form of computer-executable instructions, data structures, or
processor chip design. When information or instructions are
provided via a network or another communications connec-
tion (either hardwired, wireless, or combination thereof) to
a computer, the computer properly views the connection as
a computer-readable medium. Thus, any such connection is
properly termed a computer-readable medium. Combina-
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tions of the above should also be included within the scope
of the computer-readable storage devices.
Computer-executable instructions include, for example,
instructions and data which cause a general purpose com-
puter, special purpose computer, or special purpose process-
ing device to perform a certain function or group of func-
tions. Computer-executable instructions also include
program modules that are executed by computers in stand-
alone or network environments. Generally, program mod-
ules include routines, programs, components, data struc-
tures, objects, and the functions inherent in the design of
special-purpose processors, etc. that perform particular tasks
or implement particular abstract data types. Computer-ex-
ecutable instructions, associated data structures, and pro-
gram modules represent examples of the program code
means for executing steps of the methods disclosed herein.
The particular sequence of such executable instructions or
associated data structures represents examples of corre-
sponding acts for implementing the functions described in
such steps.
Other embodiments of the disclosure may be practiced in
network computing environments with many types of com-
puter system configurations, including personal computers,
hand-held devices, multi-processor systems, microproces-
sor-based or programmable consumer electronics, network
PCs, minicomputers, mainframe computers, and the like.
Embodiments may also be practiced in distributed comput-
ing environments where tasks are performed by local and
remote processing devices that are linked (either by hard-
wired links, wireless links, or by a combination thereof)
through a communications network. In a distributed com-
puting environment, program modules may be located in
both local and remote memory storage devices.
The various embodiments described above are provided
by way of illustration only and should not be construed to
limit the scope of the disclosure. Various modifications and
changes may be made to the principles described herein
without following the example embodiments and applica-
tions illustrated and described herein, and without departing
from the spirit and scope of the disclosure. For example,
measurements from various other types of data sources can
be included within the analysis. Virtual optical and accel-
eration measurements of keystrokes or chair movement, for
example, can be provided. The number of different data
streams can be two, three, four, five, or more depending on
the necessary circumstances. As noted above, a "processor"
can be part of essentially any kind of device such as a
refrigerator, a copier, a wearable device such as a watch,
hearing aid, pacemaker, jewelry, etc. Furthermore, a device
can be an enclosure such as a room, which "device" can have
more than one reporting pathway. The boundary of a device
or an enclosure is a data stream or a processor and the
reporting pathways represent the boundary of a device or
enclosure. Claim language reciting "at least one of a set
indicates that one member of the set or multiple members of
the set satisfy the claim.
The invention claimed is:
1. A method of identifying anomalous device behavior or
potential anomalous device behavior, the method compris-
ing:
receiving first data from a first device via a first data path,
the first device is being accessed by a user, a first
application on said first device gathers and transmits
said first data;
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receiving second data from a second device associated
with the user via a second data path, a second appli-
cation on said second device gathers and transmits said
second data;
5 receiving third data from a third data source associated
with the user via a third data path;
comparing the first data, the second data and the third data
to base-line data comprising usage patterns of the user
to yield a comparison;
10 when the comparison indicates a potential anomaly, one
of said first application and said second application
adjusts timing of the gather and transmit of said first
data or said second data, respectively; and
when the comparison indicates an anomaly from the
15 base-line data, providing a notice that one of access or
use of the first device is not authorized,
wherein the first data path, the second data path, and the
third data path are independent data paths from each
other such that each said device is isolated from each
20 other device and each said device has a different data
path, respectively.
2. The method of claim 1, wherein the first device is a
computer, the second device is a mobile device and the third
data source is a facilities-based source.
25 3. The method of claim 1, wherein the second data is
location data of the second device.
4. The method of claim 1, wherein the third data is derived
from an environment sensor connected to one of a keyboard,
a phone, a chair, a mouse, and a door.
30 5. The method of claim 1, wherein one of the first data, the
second data and the third data comprises one of temperature
data, a magnetosphere reading, a compass reading, a light
level, a proximity sensor reading, a keycard access reading,
device performance data, image data, keyboard data, rate-
35 of-change data, location data, software usage data, elevation
data, social media data, weather data, and device internal
functionality.
6. The method of claim 1, wherein the base-line data
further comprises data of usage patterns of other individuals
40 in a same category as the user.
7. The method of claim 1, wherein the timing comprises
an increased number of reports of the data.
8. The method of claim 1, wherein the usage patterns
relate to usage, by the user, of the first device, the second
45 device and the third data source.
9. A system of identifying anomalous device behavior or
potential anomalous device behavior, the system compris-
ing:
a processor; and
50 a computer-readable storage device storing instructions
which, when executed by the processor, cause the
processor to perform operations comprising:
receiving first data from a first device via a first data path,
the first device is being accessed by a user, a first
55 application on said first device gathers and transmits
said first data;
receiving second data from a second device associated
with the user via a second data path, a second appli-
cation on said second device gathers and transmits said
60 second data;
receiving third data from a third data source associated
with the user via a third data path;
comparing the first data, the second data and the third data
to base-line data comprising usage patterns of the user
65 to yield a comparison;
when the comparison indicates a potential anomaly, one
of said first application and said second application
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adjusts timing of the gather and transmit of said first
data or said second data, respectively; and
when the comparison indicates an anomaly from the
base-line data, providing a notice that one of access of
or use of the first device is not authorized,
wherein the first data path, the second data path, and the
third data path are independent data paths from each
other such that each said device is isolated from each
other device and each said device has a different data
path, respectively.
10. The system of claim 9, wherein the first device is a
computer, the second device is a mobile device and the third
data source is a facilities-based source.
11. The system of claim 9, wherein the second data is
location data of the second device.
12. The system of claim 9, wherein the third data is
derived from an environment sensor connected to one of a
keyboard, a phone, a chair, a mouse, and a door.
13. The system of claim 9, wherein one of the first data,
the second data and the third data comprises one of tem-
perature data, a magnetosphere reading, a compass reading,
a light level, a proximity sensor reading, a keycard access
reading, device performance data, image data, keyboard
data, rate-of-change data, location data, software usage data,
elevation data, social media data, weather data, and device
internal functionality.
14. The system of claim 9, wherein the base-line data
further comprises data of usage patterns of other individuals
in a same category as the user.
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15. A computer-readable storage device storing instruc-
tions which, when executed by a computing device, cause
the computing device to perform operations comprising:
receiving first data from a first device via a first data path,
s the first device is being accessed by a user, a first
application on said first device gathers and transmits
said first data;
receiving second data from a second device associated
with the user via a second data path, a second appli-
10 cation on said second device gathers and transmits said
second data;
receiving third data from a third data source associated
with the user via a third data path;
comparing the first data, the second data and the third data
15 to base-line data comprising usage patterns of the user
to yield a comparison;
when the comparison indicates a potential anomaly, one
of said first application and said second application
adjusts timing of the gather and transmit of said first
20 data or said second data, respectively; and
when the comparison indicates an anomaly from the
base-line data, providing a notice that one of access of
or use of the first device is not authorized,
wherein the first data path, the second data path, and the
25 third data path are independent data paths from each
other such that each said device is isolated from each
other device and each said device has a different data
path, respectively.
